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A friend once told me about the cows corralled in a 
nearby pasture. Once a year men come to take away 
their calves. "Afterward the cows moo for four days 
and nights," she said. 
I myself know what a distressed moo sounds like. 
And now when I hear it coming across the fields I 
think of mother cows losing their calves. When I hold 
the image of the mother cow in my mind against the 
remembrance ofmy mother's potroast. the mother cow 
wins. When I recall the cow's cries, I cannot imagine 
accepting my mother's offer. 
Why do I call this writing "feminist reflections?" 
First, Iam p13cticing a common feminist methodology: 
raising consciousness through storytelling. Second, in 
my reflections I focus on feminist thought to articulate 
some problems with my relations to other domestic 
animals. I use the work of feminist writers to discuss 
caring, oppression, and spirituality. I use the word 
"reflections" to suggest that I am not trying to establish 
or prove a particular thesis. l I intend my observations 
to raise questions, rather than answer them. 
Napenthe 
I took Napenthe from her family when she was a 
kitten. Her "owner" sold her to me. Napenthe stayed 
in the closet of my studio aparunent for two days, 
then accepted me as her companion. For years I lived 
alone, and she had my full attention. She curled up 
beside me whenever she chose, though I pushed her 
away when she tried to come between me and a book. 
Every night Napenthe crawled in under the covers 
beside me. 
When we moved in with my love, he didn't want 
Napenthe in the bedroom at night "You cuddle her 
instead of me," he said. And so we shut the bedroom 
door against Napenthe. When she cried, as only a 
Siamese can, and woke us up, we confined her 
downstairs near her next favorite resting place, the top 
of the hot water heater. 
In the morning or if I've been away for the day, 
Napenthe follows me closely and meows in her most 
complaining tone until I pick her up. She snuggles 
against my neck, rubs her nose against my ear for a few 
minutes, then when I put her down, she goes back to 
the hot water heater or under the wood stove. But 
sometimes when I'm in a morning rush or cranky after 
a day at school, I brush her off. 
Cats like animal contact When ours are allowed in 
the bedroom in the morning, all three snuggle up against 
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me. Mutley kneads the blanketover my chest. Napenthe 
washes my ears, and Turtle licks my hand. But my eats 
never feel a coarse tongue against their own ears. Raised 
away from each other, they 00 not sleep togetherocgroom 
each other the way littennates 00.2 
Caring with Cats 
In her book, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics 
and Moral Education, Nell Noddings places caring and 
the commiunent to sustain it at the "universal heart" of 
her ethic.3 Her paradigm ofcaring is a human nother's 
engrossment in her child. She writes, 
The caring of mother for child, ofhuman adult 
for human infant. elicits the tenderest feelings 
in most of us. Indeed, for many women this 
feeling of nurturance lies at the very heart of 
what we assess to be good.4 
Though Noddings allows that other animals care 
and can respond to human care, human obligations to 
care extend primarily to other humans. She writes, 
"A philosophical position that has difficulty distin­
guishing between our obligation to human infants and, 
say, pigs is in some difficulty straight off. It violates 
our most deeply cherished feeling about human 
goodness." For Noddings, my obligation to care is 
limited by the nature of my potential relationship with 
the one I would care for; I have an obligation to care 
only ifa potential for mutual response exists. Noddings 
believes that whereas human children have potential 
for mutual response, other animals can never respond 
mutually.S Thus, my obligations to nonhuman animals 
are limited. 
Now, there are notorious problems with Noddings' 
view that obligation derives from mutual response. It 
rules out obligations to distant humans, as well as 
obligations to animals and the environment Nonetheless, 
Noddings' ethical ideal has some good results for 
animals. Her recognition that other animals care and 
her placement of caring as an ideal entail that car~ 
giving nonhuman animals are valuable, regardless of 
their usefulness to humans. If I had thought as much 
about Napenthe's needs as my own and if I had valued 
caring relationships between cats, I would have left 
Napenthe with her family oradopted her siblings. Then 
she would have family members to lick her ears and 
keep her warm at night6 
Morality in Human Terms 
One day when driving along a freeway cut through 
the hills of Sonoma County in Northern California, I 
listened to a woman-a self-described animal psychic­
talking about animals raised for slaughter. In the 
background I heard the sounds of a slaughterhouse. In 
her soft, reassuring voice, the woman said she'd gone 
to the slaughterhouse to detennine for herself how cattle 
felt about their lives. She described the slaughterhouse 
process step by step. She said the cattle did not 
experience extensive pain. She said the cattle said they 
were satisfied with their lives, for they understood they 
were giving up their lives for a good purpose. The 
interviewer asked a man working at the slaughterhouse 
what he thought This country man, who'd been at the 
slaughterhouse working daily with the cattle, replied 
that he didn't know what the cows thought. 
I present this example to warn that closeness is no 
guarantee of enlightenment, nor for that matter is 
engrossment. I've never been to a slaughterhouse, so I 
can't compare my experiencewith this woman's. But I 
felt sick listening to her. Her statement reminded me 
ofhearing women described as satisfied in their service 
roles. But throughout history, oppressed people have 
put on a good face to service to avoid social, economic, 
or physical reprisals.7 Thus before we can use an 
oppressed person's voice to justify our actions, we need 
to look at whether she is speaking freely. In the case of 
beings who do not share a language, more difficulties 
arise. Here it's not just a question of being aware of a 
false voice but of trying to imagine how the being would 
describe her good, if she could. In making this 
determination we need to be wary of human bias. We 
need to consider whether one who benefits from a cow's 
service can honestly judge the cow's own good. 
Humans are often not to be trusted in judging a cow's 
good, nor in judging a cow's value. In detennining 
value, philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, Mill, 
Bentham, and Noddings, begin with humans. They treat 
man and, more recently, woman as the measure of all 
things. Other animals come off best with Bentham, 
but even so their intrinsic value diminishes as their 
ability to experience pleasure and pain diminishes. 
But leaving aside for the moment the question of 
human presumption, there is another problem for 
humans in assessing animal welfare. How can we 
recognize the deprivation of other animals, when we 
do not see our own? I sit in my study, no longer feeling 
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the paper under my hand. I click., click, click on the 
keyboard of my computer. I teach under fluorescent 
lights in rooms that have no windows. Two weeks after 
the switch to daylight savings time I am still surprised 
when I come from my evening class to find it light 
outside. It could have been midnight or noon. My 
classroom does not show the difference. Is it any 
wonder that, in my separation from nature, I don't worry 
over removing animals from their natural habitats? Do 
family-room toucans miss the damp smell of tropical 
forests and the cries of howler monkeys? How could I 
have such thoughts without raging over my own 
domestication? But from my human point of view, 
forced air heating and fluorescent lights are progress. 
The toucan is lucky to share my room with me. 
Oppression 
I've talked about humans oppressing other animals. 
But I wonder in what sense the concept "oppression" 
applies. When feminists talk of the oppression of 
women, we focus on the absence of women from 
positions ofpolitical and economic power. We describe 
the societal attitudes ingrained in us to keep us 
politically and economically powerless. But surely 
other animals do not seek senate seats and equal pay 
for equal work. With other animals should we then 
think in terms of suffering, rather than of oppression? 
Marilyn Frye's article, "Oppression," suggests an 
answer to this question. Though Frye focuses on the 
oppression of women, her analysis can be extended to 
other animals. She writes: 
[I]t is clear that if one wants to determine
 
whether a particular suffering, harm or
 
limitation is partof someone's being oppressed,
 
one has to look at it in context in order to tell
 
whether it is an element in an oppressive
 
structure: one has to see if it is part of an
 
enclosing structure of forces and barriers
 
which tends to the immobilization and
 
reduction of a group or category of people.
 
One has to look at how the barrier or force fits
 




Frye's analysis of oppression applies to domestic 
animals. Humans create social forces and barriers 
which limit cows and cats. Domestication itself limits 
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cow and cat behavior. But cows and cats are further 
controlled for human purposes. Scratching cats are 
declawed. Cows are forced to join the milk producing 
work foree. Humans limit cow and cat behavior for 
hwnanends. 
I add another feature to oppression. The oppressor 
justifies suffering and control by appealing to the 
oppressor's greater value. This feature of oppression 
highlights a difference between the way humans and 
nonhumans experience oppression: humans experience 
not only the pain of confinement but also the 
humiliation of being undervalued. Other oppressed 
animals don't have the additional pain of recognizing 
that humans devalue them. But other animals are 
undervalued, caused pain, and controlled for our 
benefit and to their detriment. Thus, other animals 
are oppressed. 
Seeing God 
My description ofhuman oppression ofotheranimals 
presupposes that humans are not more valuable than 
animals. I do not know how to establish this assumption. 
But then neither has anyone established the alternative, 
that humans are intrinsically more valuable than other 
animals. I can't tell you how I know my assumption to 
be true. But I can tell you something about how I came 
to accept it, or I should say, how I came to try it on. For 
I'm not sure I do fully accept it 
When I was a child I lay awake at night anguishing 
about going to hell. I was worried because I didn't 
know how to believe in God, and I had been told I 
would go to hell if! didn't believe. Eventually I solved 
my problem by giving up my belief in hell. Though I 
sometimes felt I missed something by not believing in 
a spiritual world, I never wanted to believe in a God I 
had come to associate with oppression and violence. 
But then I began to think I could believe in God after 
all, when I read Alice Walker's The Color Purple. 
Here's how Shug describes how she found God: 
My first step from the old white man was 
trees. Then air. Then birds. Then other 
people. But one day when I was sitting quiet 
and feeling like a motherless child, which I 
was, it come to me: that feeling of being part 
of everything, not separate at all. I knew that 
if I cut a tree, my arm would bleed. And I 
laughed and I cried and I run all around the 
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house. I knew just what it was. In fact, when 
it happen, you can't miss it.9 
But how does one take the flfSt step? How does one 
see the trees as sacred? Or the air? or birds? Celie 
reports what Shug says: 
Still, it like Shug say, You have to git man off 
your eyeball, before you can see anything a'tall. 
Man cormpt everything, say Shug. He on your
 
box of grits, in your head, and allover the
 
radio. He try to make you think he every­

where. Soon as you think he everywhere,
 
you think he God. But he ain't Whenever
 
you trying to pray, and man plop himself on
 
the otherend of it, tell him to get lost, say Shug.
 
Conjure up flowers, wind, water, a big rock.10
 
Long after I gave up my belief in hell, I still had man on 
my eyeball. I had used man as thedetermination ofvalue. 
I valued myself to the extent I had traits like those 
traditionally associated with men. More recently, 
through the work of feminist writers like Noddings and 
Carol Gilligan, I added woman to my eyeball. Now 
I'm trying to remove both man and woman from my 
eyeball, so I can see the value in other animals. 11 
The Yellow Tom and Old Grey 
Hecamerunning when I called, although I had never 
called him before. I hadn't wanted to encourage him. 
But when I finally called him, he nuzzled up against 
me, as ifhe'd been waiting his whole life. Hegotaway 
once from the cat carrier. My stepson, who was standing 
nearby, said, "You'll never capture him now." "He will 
come to me," I said. I could see the cat was so starved 
for care that he would come, and he did. He came out 
from under the porch when I called, and that time I was 
able to lock him in the carrier. 
I still wonder at myself. How could I have taken 
him to the animal shelterafter witnessing his need? On 
the way to the shelter I became more and more 
distressed. But I reminded myself that the tom had been 
chasing and attacking our female cats, that one of them 
was pregnant and he might kill her kittens, that he was 
spraying all around our house. With these justifications 
I could still not go into the shelter, until I decided to 
adopt another cat in his place. And so I got Mutley. 
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Now there's a stray grey tom. When we're asleep 
or gone, he comes in through the upstairs cat door, eats 
the cat food, sprays, and leaves again. My love says, 
"In the old days, I would have shot him." The old days 
are gone. My love put a door at the bottom of the 
stairway to keep Old Grey from spraying on the new 
mg. But the tom still routinely perfumes my study. 
Our veterinarian says we should get rid of him. She 
suggests we rent a Havahart trap. But I'm reluctant. 
What has he done after all? Our cats don't seem to 
mind him, and we have no kittens to protect He could 
catch and carry rabies, but then so, too, could the skunks, 
and I'm not considering trapping them. I haven't for­
gotten how I felt when I took the yellow tom to the 
animal shelter. I think I can live with Old Grey's spray. 
Ideals and Reality 
How can I say what I say and still act as I do?12 If 
I really believed that humans are not more valuable than 
other animals, would I even think about trapping Old 
Grey? I suppose I could be more generous to myself 
and ask instead, if I hadn't considered the value of 
Old Grey, would I even have considered not trapping 
him? But I want to focus now on how I am limited by 
the behavior of other humans. 
I wouldn't have had to decide how to respond to 
Old Grey, if some other human had not made a pet out 
ofhim and then abandoned him. My predicament flows 
from the activities ofother humans. I wish I could put 
him back on their doorstep. But I can't I don't know 
who they are. And if I did, they'd probably just drop 
him in the country again or take him to the animal shelter. 
Ultimately my predicament with Old Grey stems 
from the domestication of animals. If he were a wild 
cat and not a pet. he'd stay in the woods like the bobcats. 
If I didn') have other domesticated female cats in my 
house, he would not come in to spray. But Old Grey's 
a thoroughly domesticated animal, and I do have three 
female cats. Naturally, he's going to visit. 
I wonder if I'd be better off without domesticated 
animals. I wouldn't have the trouble with Old Grey. 
But then I wouldn't have my little love slave, Napenthe, 
either. In spite of my complaints about her scratchy 
tongue, I profit from her domesticated purr. I wonder 
whether I would end the domestication ofother animals, 
if I could. But even this proposal is subject to human 
bias, because I cannot communicate with other animals 
to see what they would choose for themselves. 
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RoseUa 
One October morning everal years ago an escapee 
parrot, An Australian RoselIa. appeared on a lower limb 
of a Doug. Fir tree in our yard. She woke us up with 
her loud joyous calls. 
We went to the local feed store and purchased seeds 
for her, then placed a feeder in the walnut tree close to 
our house, so we could watch her. Soon she came to 
the walnut tree every morning and looked at the front 
door until I brought the seeds ouL She flew off to the 
flf until I left again, then she flew back and ate her 
breakfast. When she was finished, other birds would 
fill the tree and soon empty the feeder. 
Rosella, as we called her, would stay for a while on 
the lower flf limb and sometimes climb down the wire 
fence and walk around in the yard. After her morning 
visit she would swoop across the blackberry pasture 
to the Monterey Cypress lining the top ofour hill. As 
she flew, she would sing a different song from the one 
that roused us in the morning. Typically, Rosella came 
back again in the late afternoon for a short visit, then 
went off until the morning feeding. This went on for 
six months. She even survived pea-sized hail and 
light snow. 
One March day Rosella didn't return. We'd talked 
about capturing her-for her own good, of cours~to 
protect her from the wind and rain and from predators: 
the cats, the owls. But we never did try very hard to 
find a way to capture her. There would have been no 
magic in a caged Rosella waiting for her morning 
sunflower seeds. Even if she had continued with the 
full range of her songs, we wouldn't be able to watch 
her swoop across the blackberries. 
Diminished RelationslExpanded Relations 
I had questioned caging birds before I knew Rosella. 
Butafter hearing her sing above the blackberries, Icould 
never keep a bird in a cage. I don't think anyone would 
want a bird in a cage if they had known Rosella. To get 
even a glimpse ofa freed pet gives one a new ideal. 
The trick is to get this experience. It's the same 
with human relations. If you're lucky enough to 
experience a relationship in which there's mutual caring 
and respect, you'll never be satisfied with less. But 
because humans are often raised with models of abuse 
of power, mutual caring and respect seems a 
romanticized ideal rather than a realizable goal. It was 
Fall 1990 217 
only after years of psychoanalysis that I learned to 
expect mutual caring and respect. Now I accept nothing 
less. I suspect the same is true ofus and other animals. 
We would not want to go back, if we ever gave up 
oppressive relations with them. But it's hard to see this 
now, for in the existing world oppressive relations 
between humans and other animals are the norm. 
Lingering Doubts 
Whenever I assign papers on controversial topics, I 
ask the sbJdents to come to a conclusion, but also to 
express their lingering doubts. There's something 
liberating about this exercise. One needn't have final 
answers before offering a conclusion. In writing this 
essay I've allowed myself to make a claim that might 
otherwise strike me as wild, because I knew I'd have 
the opportunity to express my lingering doubts. I'm 
not really doubtful about my suggestion that we remove 
man from our eyeballs, that is, that we stop using 
humans as the measure ofall things. I think we should 
give this a try. But I'm anxious about what we'll fmd. 
Will we judge a cat to have equal importance to a child? 
What will this mean for how we treat cats and children? 
I don't know how to begin answering these questions, 
and so I leave them as lingering doubts. But though I 
find these doubts disturbing, I am not yet ready to take 
back my suggestion. I suspect humans need to 
reconsider their place in the world, and my suggestion 
is one way to begin. 
A Cow on Vacation 
There's one more story I want to tell. A few days 
ago I was driving back from the coast when I saw a 
cow with an udder ballooning almost to the ground. 
The rest of theherd moved up the hillside as they grazed. 
She lagged behind, moving slowly, her hind legs 
straddling her enormous udder. But still she moved 
toward the others. I pulled over, turned around, and 
drove back so my love could see her. Then we started 
looking for the farmer. I thought she was ill or that 
someone had forgotten to milk her. I was afraid she 
would burst. 
We found a farmer a few miles up the road. She 
wasn't his cow, but he'd had others like her. He told us 
calves grow two-thirds of their size in the last two 
months of pregnancy. Dairy farmers stop milking 
pregnant cows for those two months, so the cow will 
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have plenty of nutrition for the calf. "We call it 'going 
on vacation, ,,, the farmer said. 
"But are you sure she's all right?" I asked and 
described again how she looked. 
"That's the way they get, especially the older ones," 
he said.. "Her udder will start shrinking again in about 
a week." 
I haven't been able to get the image of that cow out 
of my head. I wish I could Whenever I think of ice 
cream, cheese, and calcium, I see her struggling to 
follow the others up the hill. 
Serious Wrongs 
"How can you think about cats and cows, when 
women still do not have political and economic equality?" 
This thought keeps coming to me. It echoes another 
thought, "How can you think about women's equality, 
when Nicaraguans are being killed in your name?" 
Don't these very questions presuppose the superiority 
of human suffering? Perhaps I should just ignore them. 
But even if I accept the full worth of nonhuman animal 
suffering, I would still want to think about the suffering 
of women and Nicaraguans. Since time is short, I would 
like to find ways of integrating my concerns. Some 
connections come to mind. I think: of my love saying, 
"In other days, I would have shot the tom." He would 
have killed a cat to protect me from its spray. Another 
friend tells me of her illinois father. Frightened family 
women called him in from the fields to kill hannless 
snakes. Through killing an animal this man "protects" 
the women. Men and women who practice these roles 
reinforce the power structure that keeps women and other 
animals oppressed The woman seems helpless without 
the man, even with a harmless snake or cat From early 
on women allow and even invitemen to kill in ournames. 
And so when our government tells us that Nicaragua is 
dangerous, are not many women inclined to leave 
Nicaragua to the men, too? 
As one who wants to stop oppression in all its fonns. 
I fmd it useful to study a system ofoppression in which 
I am not a victim. By looking at my relations with 
domestic animals I see how I benefit from oppression. 
And I see the ties that bind me to oppression. I cannot 
simply give up role as oppressor unless the system of 
domesticity changes. But though I cannot single­
handedly end systems of oppression, that should not 
stop me from describing them and the suffering they 
bring to their victims, whether human or cat. 
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I am grateful to Pat Demery, Sterling Bennett, and 
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